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Reforma do Conselho de Segurança das 
Nações Unidas: O Imperador nu
Ljubo Runjic**
 ‘When all the world as it is today, at war – piecemeal though that war may be 
– a little here, a little there, and everywhere – there is no justification – and 
God weeps. Jesus weeps.’
Pope Francis1
AbstrAct
Although the United Nations General Assembly included the issue of  
the Security Council’s reform on its agenda in 1992, the negotiations on 
this vital issue haven’t broken the impasse even after a quarter of  a century. 
At the same time we have testified to a series of  major armed conflicts 
worldwide. This article emphasizes the need for an urgent reform of  the 
Security Council, i.e. unacceptability of  its further postponement, because 
the Council has largely failed in performing its main function – maintenance 
of  international peace and security. Furthermore, the Security Council has 
no longer the necessary credibility, legitimacy and representativeness for the 
enactment and implementation of  key decisions. The article analyzes key 
issues of  the reform of  the Security Council and proposes some possible 
solutions regarding the composition of  the Council and the issue of  veto. 
Finally, the article reviews the unsuccessful efforts to reform the Council 
with a special emphasis on the events on the eve of  the 70th anniversary of  
the United Nations.
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resumo
Embora a Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas tenha incluído a questão 
da reforma do Conselho de Segurança em sua agenda em 1992, as nego-
ciações sobre essa questão vital não lograram êxito, mesmo depois de um 
quarto de século. Ao mesmo tempo, testemunhamos uma série de grandes 
conflitos armados no mundo todo. Este artigo enfatiza a necessidade de 
uma reforma urgente da Conselho de Segurança, ou seja, a inaceitabilidade 
de seu adiamento adicional, porque O Conselho falhou em grande parte na 
execução de sua principal função, a manutenção da paz e da segurança in-
1  POPE, Francis. The Lord weeps for the sins of  a world at war. 2015. Available at: <http://
en.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/11/19/pope_francis_the_lord_weeps_for_the_sins_of_a_
world_at%20_%20war_/1187974> Access on: 11 nov. 2016.
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ternacionais. Além disso, o Conselho de Segurança não 
tem mais a credibilidade, a legitimidade e a representati-
vidade necessárias para a promulgação e a implementa-
ção de decisões-chave. O artigo analisa as importantes 
questões da reforma do Conselho de Segurança e pro-
põe algumas possíveis soluções relativas à composição 
do Conselho e à questão do veto. Finalmente, o artigo 
analisa os esforços infrutíferos para reformar o Conse-
lho com uma ênfase especial nos eventos na véspera do 
70º aniversário de as Nações Unidas.
Palvras-chave: United Nations, Security Council, Re-
form
1. IntroductIon
If  we look at the Article 1 of  the United Nations 
Charter,2 we will see that the main purpose of  the Uni-
ted Nations is to maintain international peace and se-
curity, and to that end: to take effective collective mea-
sures for the prevention and removal of  threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of  acts of  aggression 
or other breaches of  the peace. Article 24 of  the Char-
ter entrusts the Security Council with the primary res-
ponsibility for the maintenance of  international peace 
and security, thus making it the most important body 
within the United Nations. Furthermore, Article 25 of  
the Charter stipulates the binding effect of  the Security 
Council’s decisions for all United Nations Member Sta-
tes, while Article 39 specifies that the Security Council 
shall determine the existence of  any threat to the peace, 
breach of  the peace or act of  aggression.3 Finally, Ar-
2  For the text of  the Charter see: UNITED NATIONS. Charter 
of  the United Nations. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/charter-
united-nations/> Access on: 11 nov. 2016.
3  Although there is no definition of  aggression (initiation of  war) 
in the current international law, we can emphasize Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of  the United Nations General Assembly, which approves 
the definition of  aggression. Article 1 of  the Resolution defines ag-
gression as the use of  armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of  another State, or the 
use of  armed force in any other manner inconsistent with the UN 
Charter. Article 2 specifies that the first use of  armed force by a State 
in contravention of  the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence 
of  an act of  aggression, although the Security Council may conclude 
that such a determination would not be justified in the light of  other 
relevant circumstances. Article 3 enumerates acts which could be 
qualified as acts of  aggression, while Article 4 stipulates that the 
enumerated acts are not exhaustive and that the Security Council 
may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provi-
sions of  the Charter. See: UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 
ticle 41 provides that the Security Council may decide 
what measures not involving the use of  armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, while Ar-
ticle 42 enables the Security Council to use force as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. In this way, considering that the use of  for-
ce is prohibited in the international law,4 except in the 
case of  self-defence,5 the states have given the mono-
poly on the use of  force to the Security Council, which 
has thus become the key player in the United Nations’ 
collective security system. Moreover, the founders of  
the United Nations gave the right to veto the Council’s 
decisions in the previously mentioned cases only to the 
five permanent members of  the Security Council, thus 
making them morally most responsible for the mainte-
nance of  international peace and security. 
Unfortunately, in its seven decades of  existence, 
the United Nation’s most powerful body – the Secu-
rity Council – has largely demonstrated inefficiency in 
1974). See also CASSESE, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2001. p. 256-259; BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles 
of  Public International Law. 7. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008. p. 591-592, 735-737; DINSTEIN, Yoram. War, Aggression and 
Self-Defence. 5. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 
124-162. The other two concepts – ‘threat to peace’ and ‘breach of  
peace’ – have never been defined, and depend on the discretionary 
decision by the Security Council, depending on the case.
4  For centuries, the right to war was one of  the fundamental 
rights of  every sovereign country. However, after the adoption of  
the Kellogg-Briand Pact from 1928, war was prohibited, and the 
right to start a war (aggression) became prohibited for the first time 
in the international customary law. Article 1 of  the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact stipulates: ‘The High Contracting Parties solemly declare in the 
names of  their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to 
war for the solution of  international controversies, and renounce 
it, as an instrument of  national policy in their relations with one 
another.’ See: LEAGUE OF NATIONS. General Treaty for Renun-
ciation of  War as an Instrument of  National Policy (signed 27 Au-
gust 1928) 94 LNTS 57. Available at: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2094/v94.pdf> Accessed on: 
18 nov. 2016.
   Article 2(4) of  the UN Charter stipulates: ‘All Members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of  force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of  any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of  the United 
Nations.’
5  Article 51 of  the UN Charter stipulates: ‘Nothing in the pre-
sent Charter shall impair the inherent right of  individual or collec-
tive self-defence if  an armed attack occurs against a Member of  the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken 
by Members in the exercise of  this right of  self-defence shall be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of  the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems neces-
sary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’
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performing its main function. It is enough to mention 
the recent armed conflicts which took place on the ter-
ritory of  Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Syria, to 
understand that the existing collective security system 
of  the United Nations led by the Security Council does 
not function. It was adapted to the circumstances from 
1945, but since then the picture of  the world has chan-
ged completely.6 Instead of  massive ground, air and 
naval attacks, threats to international peace and secu-
rity have assumed another, entirely new and different 
dimension which the authors of  the Charter obviously 
could not have envisaged.7 Threats are no longer posed 
by wars among states alone; now they are a lot more 
subtle, more sophisticated, more vicious and more dan-
gerous. We are living in a time when bloody civil wars 
are raging around the globe, usually concealing genoci-
de and ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, we are also faced 
with the problem of  terrorism which knows no state 
boundaries and pays no heed to the casualties and con-
sequences. Closely related to terrorism is the prolifera-
tion of  weapons of  mass destruction. If  we continue to 
list the new threats such as humanitarian crises, poverty, 
hunger, environmental pollution and non-democratic 
regimes, we will come to realize that the existing Secu-
rity Council is inadequate for the 21st century. This is 
partially due to the fact that, unlike the threats to inter-
national peace and security which have changed consi-
derably over the past seven decades, the Security Coun-
cil as the key player in the collective security system of  
the United Nations remained the same, trapped in the 
past of  Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta.
Precisely for this reason, a reform of  the Securi-
ty Council is a priority, not only for the Organization 
whose primary purpose is the maintenance of  interna-
tional peace and security, but for all its Member States 
as well, which entrusted the Security Council with the 
primary responsibility of  accomplishing that purpose, 
and ultimately for the humanity itself, which bears the 
consequences of  the Security Council’s functioning.8 
Although the topic of  the Security Council’s reform 
was first raised at the summit of  the non-aligned coun-
6  See e.g. YOO, John C. Force Rules: UN Reform and Interven-
tion. Chicago Journal of  International Law, v. 6, n. 2, p. 644-645, 2006.
7  See e.g. FRANCK, Thomas M. Collective Security and UN Re-
form: Between the Necessary and the Possible. Chicago Journal of  
International Law, v. 6, n. 2, p. 600, 2006.
8  See e.g. SPAIN, Anna. The U.N. Security Council’s Duty to De-
cide. Harvard National Security Journal, v. 4, p. 320, 2013.
tries in Jakarta in 1992,9 and the same year the United 
Nations General Assembly included the issue of  the 
Security Council reform on its agenda,10 we testify to 
the unfortunate fact that negotiations on this vital is-
sue are still at an impasse, even after almost a quarter 
of  a century. Moreover, an institutional reform of  the 
United Nations, whose main focus is the reform of  the 
Security Council, represents one of  the main elements 
of  the overall reform of  the United Nations which was 
presented in 2004 in the Report of  the High-Level Pa-
nel on threats, challenges and changes, entitled A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.11 Any efforts to 
transform the United Nations into a strong and effi-
cient organization, which will be able to face challenges, 
threats and changes of  the 21st century, primarily de-
pends on the institutional capacity of  the United Na-
tions to adapt to the new circumstances. Therefore, the 
key, and certainly the most controversial issue regarding 
the overall reform of  the United Nations is the reform 
of  the Security Council – the keeper of  the internatio-
nal peace and security.
2. twentY-fIrst centurY: world At wAr
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP), which is one of  the world’s leading data provi-
ders regarding armed conflicts,12 in 2001 – 2015 period 
the recorded number of  armed conflicts per year ranged 
between 31 to 50.13 Moreover, precisely in 2015 UCDP 
recorded 50 armed conflicts – second largest number 
9  See: NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. Tenth Conference of  
Heads of  State or Government of  Non-Aligned Countries, ‘The 
Jakarta Message: A Call for Collective Action and the Democrati-
zation of  International Relations’ (6 September 1992) NAC 10/
Doc 12/Rev 1. Available at: <s://disarmament-library.un.org/U 
NODA/Library.nsf/2b805de29c38b2fa85257631004b2105/a716
c283e6ce532a8525779200672575/$FILE/A-47-675-S-24816_In-
donesia-Jakarta%20msg-10th%20Conf%20of%20NAM.pdf> Ac-
cessed on: 26 nov. 2016.
10  See: UNGA Res. 47/62 (11 December 1992).
11  See: UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004.
12  An armed conflict is defined by the UCDP as a contested in-
compatibility that concerns government or territory or both where 
the use of  armed force between two parties, of  which at least one is 
the government of  a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths 
in a year. UCDP definitions can be found at <http://www.pcr.uu.s 
e/research/ucdp/definitions/> Access on: 3 dec. 2016.
13  MELANDER, Erik; PETTERSON, Therése; THEMNÉR, 
Lotta. Organized Violence, 1989-2015. Journal of  Peace Research, v. 
53, n. 5, p. 729, 2016.
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of  armed conflicts in the entire post World War II pe-
riod.14 If  we examine a broader time span, from 1946 to 
2015, we will get an even clearer insight into the number 
of  armed conflicts in the 21st century. By the 1950s and 
1960s, the average number of  armed conflicts per year 
was under 20, after which it started to increase, having 
reached the number of  30 armed conflicts a year in the 
mid 1970s.15 During the 1980s and 1990s, the number 
of  armed conflicts per year was mainly over 40. Althou-
gh the number of  armed conflicts in the course of  the 
last fifteen years is smaller than those recorded in the 
1980s and 1990s, it is still relatively high with regard 
to the entire observed period from 1946 to 2015. Data 
from the Conflict Barometer – another program which 
collects and systematizes data on conflicts – also con-
firm this constatation.16 According to the Conflict Ba-
rometer data, 20 wars were recorded in 2011, which at 
the time represented the largest number of  wars since 
1945.17 This number was repeated in 2013, which again 
recorded 20 wars, while 2014 marked a new record with 
as many as 21 wars.18 In 2015, the number of  wars re-
mained high at 19.19
Armed conflicts in the 21st century resulted in 
numerous consequences, however, the worst one of  
them are millions of  human lives lost. Despite that, it 
is impossible to determine the exact number of  armed 
conflict-related deaths in this century, because the ma-
jority of  parties involved in conflicts do not provide full 
and accurate information on the matter, and because 
of  difficulties in obtaining data from the areas in which 
the conflicts are taking place. Additionally, various re-
search studies dealing with the number of  casualties in 
armed conflicts also use different methodologies, which 
14  MELANDER, Erik; PETTERSON, Therése; THEMNÉR, 
Lotta. Organized Violence, 1989-2015. Journal of  Peace Research, v. 
53, n. 5, p. 729, 2016.
15  MELANDER, Erik; PETTERSON, Therése; THEMNÉR, 
Lotta. Organized Violence, 1989-2015. Journal of  Peace Research, v. 
53, n. 5, p. 729, 2016.
16  HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT RESEARCH. Conflict Barometer 2014. Heidelberg: 
HIIK, 2015. p. 15-16. 
17  HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT RESEARCH. Conflict Barometer 2011. Heidelberg: 
HIIK, 2012. p. 2. 
18  HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT RESEARCH. Conflict Barometer 2014, Heidelberg: 
HIIK, 2015. p. 15. 
19  HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT RESEARCH. Conflict Barometer 2015. Heidelberg: 
HIIK, 2016. p. 13. 
in turns leads to different estimates of  the number of  
casualties in certain conflicts. Nonetheless, the aim of  
this article is not to determine the exact figures, but to 
use some of  the relevant studies to examine and present 
at least approximate estimates of  the number of  human 
lives lost in the most significant armed conflicts of  this 
century, and to indicate the current trends, which will 
in turn help us form a clearer picture of  the internatio-
nal peace and security in the 21st century. According 
to one of  the studies, based on field research, the war 
in Iraq has resulted in the loss of  654 965 human li-
ves since the beginning of  the invasion in March 2003 
until June 2006.20 Another study, also based on field 
research, estimates that 461 000 deaths in the period 
between March 2003 and June 2011 can be attributed 
to the war in Iraq.21 Finally, in their research based on a 
comprehensive overview of  the main studies and data 
on the number of  casualties in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, the Nobel Peace Prize winner – International 
Physicians for the Prevention of  Nuclear War (IPPNW) 
– published their own assessment in 2014, according to 
which there were approximately one million casualties 
of  war in Iraq, 220 000 casualties of  war in Afghanistan, 
and 80 000 in Pakistan; in other words, a total of  appro-
ximately 1,3 million people were killed in the period be-
tween 2001 and 2013.22 Moreover, this is a conservative 
assessment according to the IPPNW, considering the 
fact that the total number of  casualties in these three 
countries could amount to two million.23 Another signi-
ficant armed conflict, the one in Syria, has been taking a 
grave human toll in the past several years. According to 
a study commissioned by the United Nations Office of  
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), 
20  BURNHAM, Gilbert et al. Mortality After the 2003 Invasion 
of  Iraq: A Cross-sectional Cluster Sample Survey. The Lancet, v. 368, 
p. 1421, 2006.
21  HAGOPIAN, Amy et al. Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 
2003-2011 War and Occupation: Findings from a National Cluster 
Sample Survey by the University Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study. 
PLOS Medicine, v. 10, n. 10, p. 10, 2013. 
22  INTERNATIONALE ÄRZTE FÜR DIE VERHÜTUNG 
DES ATOMKRIEGES/ÄRZTE IN SOZIALER VERANT-
WORTUNG; PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; 
PHYSICIANS FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL. Body Count – Casualty 
Figures after 10 Years of  the ‘War on Terror’ – Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan. Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: IPPNW, 2015. p. 15. 
23  INTERNATIONALE ÄRZTE FÜR DIE VERHÜTUNG 
DES ATOMKRIEGES/ÄRZTE IN SOZIALER VERANT-
WORTUNG; PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; 
PHYSICIANS FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL. Body Count – Casualty 
Figures after 10 Years of  the ‘War on Terror’ – Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan. Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: IPPNW, 2015. p. 15.
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from the beginning of  conflicts in March 2011 until 
April 2014, 191 369 conflict-related deaths were recor-
ded in Syria,24 while the Syrian Centre for Policy Re-
search (SCPR), non-governmental organization based 
in Syria, published their assessment according to whi-
ch 470 000 people were killed in the conflicts in Syria 
by the end of  2015.25 Finnaly, in April 2016, Staffan de 
Mistura, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, esti-
mated that some 400 000 people had been killed in the 
past five years of  war in Syria.26
One of  the most significant armed conflicts which 
marked the beginning of  the 21st century is certainly 
the conflict in Darfur (Sudan). Although the conflict 
which started in February 2003 is still ongoing, having 
entered its 15th year, the available research and data on 
the number of  casualties refer only to the first several 
years of  conflict. On the basis of  the conducted field 
research, back in April 2005 the Coalition for Interna-
tional Justice published that the number of  casualties 
in Darfur in the first two years of  conflicts was appro-
ximately 400 000,27 which is the number mentioned by 
other researches, such as Reeves.28 Certain authors had 
different opinions: on the basis of  a field research con-
ducted by the World Health Organization and Médecins 
Sans Frontières, in 2006 Hagan and Palloni offered their 
assessment according to which approximately 200 000 
people were killed in the first 31 months,29 while De-
gomme and Guha-Sapir estimated that 298 271 people 
were killed in the period from the early 2004 to the end 
of  2008, thereby not taking into consideration the entire 
year 2003, which has so far been the most violent year 
of  the conflict.30 In 2008, the United Nations published 
24  PRICE, Megan; GOHDES, Anita; BALL, Patrick. Updated 
Statistical Analysis of  Documentation of  Killings in the Syrian Arab Re-
public. 2014. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Countries/SY/HRDAGUpda tedReportAug2014.pdf> Access on: 
7 jan. 2017.
25  SYRIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH. Confronting 
Fragmentation! 2016. p. 61. Available at: <http://scprsyria. org /pub-
lications/policy-reports/confronting-fragmentation/> Access on: 7 
jan. 2017.
26 See: <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2016/04/
syria-envoy-claims-400000-have-died-in-syria-con flict/#.WHNb-
JPkrKUk> Access on: 7 jan. 2017.
27  COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. Chronol-
ogy of  Reporting on Events Concerning the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Wash-
ington DC, The Hague: CIJ, 2006. p. 336. 
28  REEVES, Eric. How Many Dead in Darfur? The Guardian, 
London, 20 Aug. 2007.
29  HAGAN, John; PALLONI, Alberto. Death in Darfur. Science, 
v. 313, 2006. p. 1579. 
30  DEGOMME, Olivier; GUHA-SAPIR, Debarati. Patterns of  
their assessment according to which approximately 300 
000 people were killed in Darfur.31 Despite the various 
assessments, it is obvious that it involved hundreds of  
thousands of  casualties; moreover, because the conflicts 
in the area of  Darfur, although reduced in intensity, are 
still ongoing, it is likely that the number of  casualties 
has already exceeded half  a million. Finally, apart from 
the previously mentioned figures regarding human lives 
lost in the major armed conflicts of  the 21st century, 
also alarming is the pronounced tendency towards an 
increase in the overall number of  casualties of  armed 
conflicts over the past several years. According to an 
assessment by UCDP, 70 451 people were killed in the 
armed conflicts in 2013, which represents an increase 
of  85% with regard to 2012, when 37 992 people were 
killed.32 Moreover, in the course of  2014, there were 101 
406 casualties of  armed conflicts, which represents an 
increase of  44% with regard to the previously mentio-
ned year 2013.33 In September 2016, UCDP published 
their last assessment according to which over 97 000 
deaths incurred in armed conflicts in 2015, the third-
-worst year in the post-Cold War period.34
One of  the consequences of  21st century armed 
conflicts, which has assumed cataclysmic proportions 
over the past several years, are tens of  millions of  for-
cibly displaced persons. Thus, four years ago, UNHCR 
announced that there were 45,2 million forcibly displa-
ced persons in 2012, which represents the largest num-
ber of  displaced persons since 1994, in which 47 million 
of  forcibly displaced persons were registered.35 Within 
this number, as many as 15.4 million people were re-
fugees. Moreover, according to the UNHCR data, as 
many as 51,2 million of  forcibly displaced persons were 
recorded in 2013, from which there were 16,7 million 
Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict. The Lancet, v. 375, p. 294, 2010. 
31  FARLEY, Maggie. U.N. Puts Darfur Death Toll at 300,000. Los 
Angeles Times, Los Angeles, 23 Apr. 2008.
32  PETTERSSON, Therése; WALLENSTEEN, Peter. Armed 
Conflicts, 1946-2014. Journal of  Peace Research, v. 52, n.  4, p. 538, 
2015. 
33  PETTERSSON, Therése; WALLENSTEEN, Peter. Armed 
Conflicts, 1946-2014. Journal of  Peace Research, v. 52, n.  4, p. 538, 
2015. 
34  MELANDER, Erik; PETTERSON, Therése; THEMNÉR, 
Lotta. Organized Violence, 1989-2015. Journal of  Peace Research, v. 
53, n. 5, p. 727, 2016. 
35  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REF-
UGEES. UNHCR Global Trends 2012: Displacement, The New 21st 
Century Challenge. 2013. Available at:  <http://www.unhcr.org/
statistics/countr y/51bacb0f9/unhcr-global-trends-2012.html> Ac-
cess on: 14 jan. 2017.
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refugees.36 In 2014 the number of  forcibly displaced 
persons reached 59,5 million – a level which has not 
been recorded since the Second World War, while the 
number of  refugees reached 19,5 million.37 Finally, in 
2015 the number of  forcibly displaced persons rea-
ched an all-time high for a fourth consecutive year. 
UNHCR recorded unprecedented 65,3 million forcibly 
displaced persons, including 21,3 million refugees.38 Un-
fortunately, much like the number of  persons killed in 
armed conflicts, also alarming is the pronounced ten-
dency towards a sharp increase in the number of  forci-
bly displaced persons in the past few years. Thus, only 
in the period 2012-2015, the number of  forcibly displa-
ced persons increased by 44%, while at the same time 
the number of  refugees increased by 38%. Moreover, 
it is expected that new negative records will be set in 
2016 with regard to the number of  forcibly displaced 
persons, considering the fact that armed conflicts have 
continued at the same or even higher intensity in 2015, 
and some conflicts which were thought to be over (e.g. 
Lybia) have been re-activated. 
So far presented dana are more than enough to illus-
trate the real picture of  international peace and security 
in the 21st century. In fact, they are the key evidence that 
the Security Council does not perform its main task, at 
least not with much success. To say that we are currently 
living in a peaceful and safe world, after everything we 
have previously mentioned, would be a lie. Considering 
the fact that the existing collective security system is ba-
sed on the Security Council, an urgent reform of  this 
body of  the United Nations imposes itself  as an impe-
rative for the entire international community.
36  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REF-
UGEES. UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War’s Human Cost. 2014. Avail-
able at: <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/5399a14f9/
unhcr-global-trends-2013.html> Access on: 14 jan 2017.
37  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REF-
UGEES. UNHCR Global Trends 2014: World at War. 2015. Available 
at: <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/556725e69/unhcr-
global-trends-2014.html> Access on: 14 jan. 2017.
38  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES. UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 
2015. 2016. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/
unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html> Access on: 
14 jan. 2017.
3. keY Issues of the reform of the securItY 
councIl 
Over the past 25 years, several issues related to the 
reform of  the Security Council have become apparent: 
categories of  membership, the question of  the veto, 
regional representation, size of  an enlarged Securi-
ty Council and working methods of  the Council, and 
the relationship between the Council and General As-
sembly.39 Unfortunately, the problem of  the Council’s 
functioning is much more complex, because the essen-
ce of  the problem lies in the contrasting interests of  
the five permanent members of  the Security Council.40 
Nonetheless, solving these issues could certainly help 
improve the functioning of  the Council, and therefore 
the maintenance of  international peace and security. Al-
though it is obvious that the primary goal of  the reform 
is to extend the membership of  the Security Council, 
all five issues are interconnected, and a comprehensi-
ve solution which would encompass other issues apart 
from the structural ones, like, for example, the decision-
-making process, could increase the capability and effi-
ciency of  the Council.
Extension of  the membership of  the Security Cou-
ncil stems from the criticism of  the Council’s current 
membership. The foundations of  its present-day mem-
bership were laid at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference 
in 1944. It was then that the representatives of  China, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States agreed that the Security Council shall consist of  
five permanent and six non-permanent members, which 
was afterwards approved by the other United Nations 
founder states at the San Francisco Conference in June 
1945.41 The five permanent seats were shared between 
China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Considering the fact that the 
number of  United Nations Member States grew rapi-
dly, amendments to the Charter were adopted in 1965, 
anticipating 10 non-permanent members along with the 
39  See: UNITED NATIONS. Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the 
General Assembly during its sixty-second session. 23 December 2007 – 15 
September 2008. New York: United Nations, 2008. v. 3. p. 106-107. 
40  See e.g. BUTLER, Richard. Reform of  the United Nations 
Security Council. Penn State Journal of  Law & Internationl Affairs, v. 1, 
n. 1, p. 34, 2012. 
41  US DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Dumbarton Oaks Docu-
ments on International Organization. Washington: US Department of  
State, 1944. p. 12.
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five permanent ones.42 Unlike the five permanent mem-
bers of  the Council, which were individually specified 
in the Charter, the election of  non-permanent mem-
bers is based on two criteria. Thus, Article 23 of  the 
Charter stipulates that the General Assembly shall elect 
the 10 non-permanent members of  the Security Coun-
cil by paying special regard, in the first instance to their 
contribution to the maintenance of  international peace 
and security and to the other purposes of  the Organi-
zation, and also to equitable geographical distribution. 
According to the usual practice, the 10 non-permanent 
members are elected from five regions: five from Afri-
ca and Asia, one from the Eastern Europe, two from 
Latin America, and two from the Western Europe and 
‘the rest of  the world’. Non-permanent members are 
elected for two-year terms, without the possibility for 
immediate re-election. 
The current membership of  the Security Council 
was perhaps suitable for the time of  Dumbarton Oaks 
in 1944, however, it is completely incongruous with the 
time in which we live.43 Geopolitical, military, demogra-
phic and economic picture of  the world has changed ut-
terly in comparison with the one in the aftermath of  the 
Second World War. In the past 71 years, primarily due 
to decolonization, the number of  United Nations mem-
bers has quadrupled in comparison with the number of  
founding members in 1945.44 At the same time, also due 
to decolonization, former colonial powers (France, Uni-
ted Kingdom) lost significant parts of  their territories, 
on which their power was based. On the other hand, 
new military powers such as India have emerged,45 whi-
le Japan and Germany, which rose like a phoenix from 
the ashes of  the Second World War, today represent the 
third and the fourth largest economy in the world res-
42  UNGA Res 1991 (XVIII) (17 December 1963).
43  See e.g. BLUM, Yehuda Z. Proposals for UN Security Council 
Reform. American Journal of  International Law, v. 99, n. 3, p. 637-638, 
2005; ANDERSON, Kenneth. United Nations Collective Secu-
rity and the United States Security Guarantee in an Age of  Rising 
Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop of  the Na-
tions. Chicago Journal of  International Law, v. 10, n. 1, 2009. p. 83. 
44  Currently there are 193 Member States of  the United Nations. 
After the decolonization process and admission of  the former colo-
nies into the membership of  the United Nations, the last significant 
expansion took place after the end of  the Cold War when the coun-
tries which emerged after the fall of  the Soviet Union, former Yugo-
slavia and Czechoslovakia became United Nations Member States. 
The last admitted Member States were Switzerland and East Timor 
(2002), Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011). 
45  See: <http://www.globalfirepower.com/> Access 18 jan. 
2017.
pectively.46 Moreover, due to the economic power of  
Japan and Germany, it was decided that they shall con-
tribute with 9,68% and 6,38%, respectively, to the regu-
lar United Nations’ budget for the period 2016-2018.47 
If  we compare this to other Member States, it becomes 
clear that their contributions are the second and third 
largest one. The largest contribution is made by the Uni-
ted States – 22%, while China contributes with 7,92%, 
France with 4,85%, the United Kingdom with 4,46%, 
and Russia with 3,08%.48 Furthermore, thanks to the 
demographic growth, populations of  India, Indonesia, 
Brazil and Pakistan combined make up one fourth of  
the total world population,49 while soldiers from those 
countries contribute significantly to the United Nations’ 
peacekeeping operations worldwide.50 It is obvious that 
some countries, with regard to their financial and mili-
tary contributions to the United Nations as well as to 
their military force, economic power and population 
size, are not adequately represented in the United Na-
tions, and especially in its most important body – the 
Security Council. Also, there is the issue of  the perma-
nent African seat in the Council, as it is unfair that not 
a single permanent member of  the Council comes from 
the continent whose countries make up more than one 
fourth of  the total United Nations membership.51 
On the basis of  the previously mentioned observa-
tions, we can say that the Security Council no longer 
has the necessary credibility, legitimacy and represen-
tativeness which are necessary for the enactment and 
implementation of  key decisions.52 As Giegrich rightly 
46  See: WORLD BANK. World Development Indicators 2015. Wash-
ington: World Bank Group, 2015. p. 24-28.
47  See: UNGA Res 70/245 (23 December 2015).
48  See: UNGA Res 70/245 (23 December 2015).
49  According to the 2016 data, India, as the second largest popu-
lation in the world, has 1,3 billion inhabitants, while Indonesia has 
260 million, which puts it in the fourth place on the global scale in 
terms of  population. Brazil is in the fifth place with 209 million peo-
ple, and Pakistan is the sixth with 193 million people. See: <http://
www.geohive.com/> Access on: 18 jan. 2017.
50  See e.g. BLUM, Yehuda Z. Proposals for UN Security Council 
Reform. American Journal of  International Law, v. 99, n. 3, p. 638-639, 
2005; see also <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/
statistics/contributor s.shtml > Access on: 20 jan. 2017.
51  The distribution of  permanent seats in the Security Council 
indeed does not comply with the democratic standards of  the 21st 
century. Five permanent seats in the Security Council are distributed 
between Europe (3), Asia (1) and North America (1). In this distri-
bution, Central and South America, Africa and Australia were left 
empty-handed. See e.g. Anderson (n 61) 83.
52  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 64.
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observed, ‘the Security Council is no longer represen-
tative of  the international community as a whole nor 
of  today’s geopolitical realities’.53 Precisely for this rea-
son, it is becoming increasingly difficult to attribute the 
Security Council’s decisions to those countries which 
are not represented in it (88% of  the United Nations 
membership) and their population which amounts to 
approximately two thirds of  the world population.54 
This can be changed only if  all main players on the 
global scene, as well as other more important countries 
from the broader United Nations membership – which 
would ensure an equitable geographic representation in 
the Council – are included in the Council’s decision-
-making process through the permanent membership in 
the Council. Furthermore, according to the recommen-
dations of  the Panel, when extending the membership, 
it is necessary to take into consideration the countries 
which contribute the most to the Organization in terms 
of  finances, military and diplomacy.55 The previously 
mentioned criteria should serve as the guidelines for 
electing new permanent members of  the Security Cou-
ncil. If  any new category of  membership in the Council 
is introduced (e.g. long-term non-permanent member-
ship), it is necessary to define the election criteria for 
that category. An expansion of  the existing member-
ship categories, or introduction of  new ones, will define 
the size of  the Council, which is important with regard 
to the Council’s working methods (e.g. the number of  
votes required for adoption of  decisions).
The issue of  the veto has been one of  the most con-
troversial issues since the establishment of  the United 
Nations. At the Yalta Conference in 1945 – the meeting 
of  the ‘Big Three’ heads of  state – the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States – a con-
sensus was reached on the decision-making process in 
the Security Council. According to the so-called ‘Yalta 
formula’, the five permanent members of  the Council 
were given the right to veto the Council’s decisions on 
all non-procedural matters, including those decisions 
regarding actions to be undertaken in case of  threats 
to the peace, breaches of  the peace, and acts of  the 
53  GIEGERICH, Thomas.‘‘A Fork in the Road’’ – Constitutional 
Challenges, Chances and Lacunae of  UN Reform. German Yearbook 
of  International Law, v. 48, p. 34, 2005. 
54  GIEGERICH, Thomas.‘‘A Fork in the Road’’ – Constitutional 
Challenges, Chances and Lacunae of  UN Reform. German Yearbook 
of  International Law, v. 48, p. 34, 2005. 
55  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 66-67.
aggression.56 At that time, it was believed that only tho-
se countries were able to guarantee peace and security, 
primarily due to their military potential.57 By giving the 
right of  veto to the five permanent members of  the Se-
curity Council, one of  the greatest contradictions regar-
ding the existence of  the United Nations was created. 
The very idea of  establishment and functioning of  the 
United Nations was based on a sovereign equality of  na-
tions.58 It is difficult to speak of  sovereign equality or of  
the much proclaimed democracy, when in certain cases 
the opinion of  one permanent member of  the Security 
Council is worth more than 188 opinions of  the United 
Nations Member States which do not have a permanent 
seat in the Security Council. The claims that this was 
necessary in order to maintain international peace and 
security were tested over the seven decades of  existen-
ce of  the United Nations. The Middle East, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Congo, Iraq, Sudan, 
Lybia and Syria represent examples in which the perma-
nent Member States used their conflicting policies and 
the right of  veto to prevent the Council from perfor-
ming its primary task, thus allowing bloody campaigns 
which resulted in tens of  millions of  dead, wounded 
and displaced persons. Moreover, the Cold War division 
completely paralyzed the work of  the Security Council, 
thus allowing numerous countries to exploit the insti-
tutional weakness and shortcomings of  the collective 
security system. For example, during the Cold War pe-
riod, the right of  veto was exercised 90 times by the 
Soviet Union, 68 times by the United States, 28 times 
by the United Kingdom, 16 times by France, and once 
by China.59 At the same time, Article 2(4) of  the UN 
Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of  force, was 
subject to numerous violations. According to one study, 
the said provision was violated 200 times, while another 
study mentions as many as 680 violations of  the said 
Article through the use of  force in interstate conflicts.60 
56  See: UN Charter Article 27.
57  See e.g. FASSBENDER, Bardo. UN Security Council Reform and 
the Right of  Veto: A Constitutional Perspective. Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 165; BUTLER, Richard. Reform of  the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council. Penn State Journal of  Law & Internationl 
Affairs, v. 1, n. 1, p. 28-29, 2012. p. 28-29.
58  The Preamble of  the Charter emphasizes the equality of  na-
tions both large and small, while the Article 2(1) of  the Charter 
stipulates that the Organization is based on the principle of  sover-
eign equality of  all its members.
59  See: <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_ta-
ble_en.htm> Access on: 23 jan. 2017.
60  GLENNON, Michael J. Platonism, Adaptivism and Illusion 
in UN Reform. Chicago Journal of  International Law, v. 2, n. 2, p. 619, 
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On the other hand, the Security Council approved the 
use of  force only once (the Korean War).61 When the 
Cold War ended, it seemed that the main reason for the 
obstruction of  work of  the Council would disappear. 
However, although the Security Council’s activities in-
tensified, reflected primarily in an increased number of  
resolutions,62 including those which contain the autho-
rization for use of  military force,63 its main task – main-
tenance of  international peace and security – remained 
largely unfulfilled. At the same time, the Security Coun-
cil remained a political arena in which the major forces 
used the right of  veto to protect their own interests, as 
well as those of  their allies.64 Moreover, Butler empha-
sizes that the use of  the right of  veto represents one of  
the most significant forms of  violation of  the privilege 
of  permanent membership in the Council.65 Although 
a further analysis of  the problem of  the functioning of  
the collective security system led by the Security Cou-
ncil would take us far beyond the topic of  this article, 
it is important to highlight that the said problem resul-
ted in ‘taking on’ the role of  the Security Council by 
2006; see also generally FRANCK, Thomas M. Who Killed Article 
2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of  Force by States. 
American Journal of  International Law, v. 64, n. 5, 1970. 
61  By Resolution S/83(1950), the Security Council authorized the 
use of  force for the first time, having recommended to United Na-
tions Member States to offer ‘all necessary help’ to South Korea 
in repelling the armed attacks of  North Korea, in order to restore 
peace and security in the area. 
62  See e.g. SCEWCZYK, Bart MJ. Variable Multipolarity and 
U.N. Security Council Reform. Harvard International Law Journal, v. 
53, n. 2, p. 454, 2012. 
63  The Security Council authorized its Member States to use 
military force by the following resolutions: Resolution S/678(1990) 
in Kuwait; Resolution S/836(1993), Resolution S/844(1993) and 
Resolution S/1031(1995) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Resolution 
S/837(1993) and Resolution S/929(1994) in Somalia; Resolution 
S/929(1994) in Rwanda; Resolution S/940(1994) in Haiti; Resolu-
tion S/1101(1997) in Albania; Resolution S/1264(1999) in East Ti-
mor; and Resolution S/1973(2011) in Libya. From these previously 
mentioned Security Council resolutions, two resolutions authorize 
one regional international organization to use force – the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By Resolution S/1031(1995), 
the Security Council has authorized the forces led by NATO in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Implementation Force – IFOR) to undertake 
all necessary measures in order to implement the so-called Dayton 
Agreement, while Resolution S/1973(2011) authorized Member 
States and regional international organizations (in reality, NATO) to 
undertake ‘all necessary measures’ in order to protect civilians and 
areas populated by civilians in Libya.
64  FRANCK, Thomas M. Collective Security and UN Reform: 
Between the Necessary and the Possible. Chicago Journal of  Interna-
tional Law, v. 6, n. 2, p. 609, 2006. 
65  BUTLER, Richard. Reform of  the United Nations Security 
Council. Penn State Journal of  Law & Internationl Affairs, v. 1, n. 1, p. 
34, 2012. 
certain players. These players, which have been using 
force without an approval of  the Security Council in an 
effort to become the ‘global policemen’, primarily in-
clude certain countries (e.g. the United States and about 
forty other countries allied in the so-called ‘Coalition 
of  the Willing’ invaded Iraq in 2003), as well as two 
regional international organizations – Economic Com-
munity of  West African States (ECOWAS) and NATO. 
On the basis of  its Protocol relating to the Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention Management, ECOWAS con-
ducted military interventions in Liberia in 1990 and in 
Sierra Leone in 1997 by its military forces (ECOWAS 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group – ECOMOG), without prior 
approval of  the Security Council.66 However, Security 
Council subsequently approved the intervention in Li-
beria – Resolution S/788(1992), and the intervention in 
Sierra Leone – Resolution S/1132(1997).67 Unlike the 
previously mentioned interventions, ECOWAS con-
ducted an intervention in Mali in 2013 on the basis of  
a prior approval of  the Security Council contained in 
Resolution S/2085(2012). On the other hand, in 1999, 
NATO attacked the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia wi-
thout a prior, or subsequent, approval of  the Security 
Council. The said attack, which was justified by the so-
-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo, constitu-
ted a gross violation of  international law by NATO and 
a dangerous precedent which threatens to fully under-
mine the current collective security system, as provided 
in the Charter of  the United Nations.68
It is obvious that the right of  veto is fully inconsis-
tent with the principles on which the United Nations 
are based, as well as with the democratic standards of  
the 21st century. Moreover, the right of  veto was the 
main instrument by which permanent members preven-
ted the Security Council from performing its main task 
over the last seven decades. However, at the same time, 
the right of  veto was the main instrument by which 
Member States protected their national interests, as well 
as the interests of  their allies. Precisely for that reason, 
66  See: Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Preven-
tion, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. Journal 
of  Conflict & Security Law, v. 5, n. 2, p. 231-259, 2000. 
67  Cf. KUWALI, Dan. The Responsibility to Protect: Implementation of  
Article 4(h) Intervention. Boston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 
2010. p. 144.
68  Cf. CASSESE, Antonio. International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. p. 298; see also SIMMA, Bruno. NATO, the 
UN and the Use of  Force: Legal Aspects. European Journal of  Interna-
tional Law, v. 10, p. 1, 1999. 
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it is unrealistic to expect that the permanent members 
will renounce this powerful tool or grant it to potential 
new permanent members of  the Council. 
At this point, the only realistic option in terms of  
mitigating the negative effects of  the right of  veto is the 
reform of  the Council’s decision-making process rela-
ted to procedural matters. Unlike the decision-making 
process related to non-procedural (substantive) matters, 
permanent members of  the Council cannot exercise 
the right of  veto when making decisions on procedural 
matters. The fact that the Council decisions on proce-
dural matters are made by an affirmative vote of  nine 
members of  the Council (theoretically, this is possible 
even without affirmative votes of  all five permanent 
members of  the Council) opens up the possibility of  a 
successful reform of  this part of  the decision-making 
process of  the Council. An additional argument in fa-
vour of  the reform of  the decision-making process 
of  the Council is the fact that the Council’s rules of  
procedure have not been changed since 1982.69 It was 
pointed out by Malaysia, which emphasized that ‘it has 
been 30 years since provisional rules have been amen-
ded. They are a relic of  the Second World War and the 
Cold War. The United Nations Security Council has 
refused to move with the times.’70 Therefore, it is ne-
cessary to consider procedural changes by which the 
Security Council would be ‘forced’ to face the threats to 
peace, breaches of  peace and acts of  aggression ‘more 
actively’. Apart from that, it is also necessary to consi-
der an improvement of  transparency and publicity of  
the decision-making process, thus creating an additional 
pressure for the members of  the Council to make deci-
sions which will be compliant with the interests of  the 
entire international community. Also, countries which 
are not members of  the Council as well as other Uni-
ted Nations bodies (the General Assembly in particular) 
should be indirectly included in the decision-making 
process. For example, Spain advocates the introduction 
of  three new procedural duties whose purpose would 
be to improve the Council’s decision-making process: 
‘the duty to decide’ would require the Council to affir-
matively decide whether or not it will take action in cri-
ses within the scope of  its authority, but if  the Council 
takes no decision, ‘the duty to disclose’ would require it 
69  See: UNITED NATIONS. Provisional Rules of  Procedure of  the 
Security Council. New York: United Nations, 1983.
70  SPAIN, Anna. The U.N. Security Council’s Duty to Decide. 
Harvard National Security Journal, v. 4, p. 367, 2013. 
to publicly state its reasons for not doing so, and finally 
‘the duty to consult’ would obligate the Council to en-
gage in broader dialogue with affected parties before 
taking serious action.71 On the other hand, at this point, 
any other proposals for the reform of  the decision-
-making process of  the Security Council which advo-
cate abolition, restriction or extension of  the right of  
veto are unfortunately doomed, since there aren’t even 
the slightest indications of  a consensus on this matter 
among the five permanent Council members.72
4. An overvIew of efforts to reform the 
securItY councIl
Ever since 1992, when the General Assembly in-
cluded the issue of  the reform of  Security Council on 
its agenda,73 we have testified to several unsuccessful 
attempts at reform of  the Council. In the late 1993, 
the General Assembly established the Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Question of  Equitable Repre-
sentation of  and Increase in the Membership of  the Se-
curity Council and Other Matters Related to the Secu-
rity Council.74 In 1997, Ismail Razali, the Chairman of  
the Working Group and the President of  the General 
Assembly, presented the plan for Council reform which 
anticipated an expansion of  the Council from 15 to 24 
members by adding five permanent members without 
the right of  veto and four non-permanent members.75 
The Razali’s plan also contained the election procedure 
of  new permanent members according to which two 
thirds of  votes of  the members of  the General Assem-
bly were required for their election. Although Razali’s 
plan was not supported by the United Nations Member 
States, it is interesting to observe that one year later the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 53/30, which 
stipulates that any decision regarding the expansion of  
membership of  the Security Council and related issues 
71  SPAIN, Anna. The U.N. Security Council’s Duty to Decide. 
Harvard National Security Journal, v. 4, p. 326, 2013. 
72  See e.g. FRANCK, Thomas M. Collective Security and UN 
Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible. Chicago Journal of  
International Law, v. 6, n. 2, p. 609, 2006; SCEWCZYK, Bart MJ. 
Variable Multipolarity and U.N. Security Council Reform. Harvard 
International Law Journal, v. 53, n. 2, p. 500-501, 2012. 
73  See: UNGA Res 47/62 (11 December 1992).
74  See: UNGA Res 48/26 (3 December 1993).
75  For the Razali’s plan see: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/
security-council/security-council-reform/41310-razali -refor m-
paper.html> Access on: 2 feb. 2017.
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cannot be made without two thirds of  votes of  the 
members of  the General Assembly.76
In 2004, High-level Panel, appointed by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, presented a comprehensi-
ve reform of  the United Nations which also contained 
proposals for the reform of  the Security Council. The 
Panel’s recommendation was that those with the most 
significant financial, military and diplomatic contribu-
tions to the Organization should be included in the 
decision-making process in the Security Council.77 Fur-
thermore, the Panel also recommended that more repre-
sentatives of  the broader United Nations membership, 
especially those of  the developing countries, should 
participate in the Council’s decision-making process as 
well.78 In this way, the Panel created a balance between 
the two main criteria for membership of  the new Cou-
ncil: ‘contribution’ to the Organization (financial, mili-
tary, and diplomatic) and overall ‘representativeness’.79 
According to the Panel, these changes should not im-
pair the effectiveness of  the Council, but rather, they 
should increase the democratic and accountable nature 
of  the Council.80 Pursuant to this, the Panel suggested 
two models of  reform of  the Security Council. The 
very fact that the Panel proposed two models clearly 
illustrates how difficult and sensitive the issue was.81 
Model A envisaged an expansion of  the Council to 24 
members by adding six new permanent seats without 
the right of  veto, and four new non-permanent seats.82 
76  See: UNGA Res 53/30 (23 November 1998).
77  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 66-67.
78  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 67.
79  BLUM, Yehuda Z. Proposals for UN Security Council Re-
form. American Journal of  International Law, v. 99, n. 3, p. 634, 2005. 
80  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 67.
81  In his letter to the United Nations Secretary-General of  2004, 
Anand Panyarachun, the Chair of  the Panel, highlighted that the 
members of  the Panel have not reached an agreement regarding 
the proposed expansion of  the Security Council. Some members 
of  the Panel strongly believed that only the expansion of  the Secu-
rity Council with new permanent members, which will not have the 
right of  veto, would allow the Security Council to cope with new 
threats successfully. Other members of  the Panel, however, equally 
strongly believed that only the expansion of  the Security Council 
with semi-permanent members was the right path for its reform. 
See: UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 6-7.
82  From the six new permanent seats, one would be awarded to 
Europe and America respectively, while Asia and Africa would each 
receive two. See: UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 67.
Model B also envisaged the expansion of  the Council 
to 24 members, but without the introduction of  new 
permanent seats. Instead, it proposed the introduction 
of  eight semi-permanent seats without the right of  veto 
(to be elected for four-year terms with the possibility of  
re-election), and one new non-permanent seat.83 In its 
report, the Panel opposed any expansion of  the right 
of  veto onto potential new members of  the Security 
Council, but it urged the permanent members to refrain 
from exercising their right of  veto, especially in cases of  
violation of  human rights and genocide. It was clearly 
emphasized that the right of  veto plays an important 
role in the preservation of  interests of  the most power-
ful Member States, as well as the fact that the institution 
of  the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsui-
table to the modern-day democratic world, and that its 
use should therefore be limited.84 
After the expansion proposed by the Panel, three 
main groups of  countries emerged with their own pro-
posals regarding the expansion of  the Security Coun-
cil. The first group consists of  Brazil, India, Japan and 
Germany (The Group of  Four or G-4), which are also 
the candidates for new permanent seats in the Securi-
ty Council. The G-4’s proposal from 2005 was closest 
to the model A, anticipating expansion of  the Securi-
ty Council with six new permanent seats without the 
right of  veto, and four non-permanent seats; in other 
words, according to their proposal, the Council would 
consist of  25 members.85 According to the G-4’s propo-
sal, two permanent seats would be awarded to African 
States, two to Asian States (India and Japan), one to La-
tin American and Caribbean States(Brazil), and one to 
Western European and other States (Germany). 
83  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 67.
84  UNITED NATIONS. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004. p. 68.
85  The only difference between the G-4 proposal and the propos-
al of  the Panel, i.e. the Panel’s Model A is reflected in the increase of  
the number of  members of  the new Council, from 24 to 25 (instead 
of  three, another four non-permanent seats were proposed). For the 
G-4 proposal, which was also supported by Afghanistan, Belgium, 
Bhutan, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Greece, 
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, 
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine 
see: UNITED NATIONS. General Assembly. UN Doc A/59/L64. 
Question of  equitable representation on and increase in the mem-
bership of  the Security Council and related matters, 6 July 2005. 
Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
LTD/N05/410/80/PDF/N0541080.pdf?OpenElement> Access 
on: 5 feb. 2017.
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The second group – United for Consensus (UFC) – 
which emerged as a reaction to G-4 and their proposal, 
among others consists of  Argentina, Italy, South Korea 
and Pakistan – regional rivals of  the members of  the 
G-4 group.86 The UFC group opposes the introduction 
of  new permanent seats in the Security Council and 
proposes 10 new non-permanent seats in the Council.87 
The UFC’s proposal is reminiscent of  Model B, as it in-
cludes the possibility of  re-election of  the non-perma-
nent members of  the Council. According to the UFC 
proposal, the expanded Security Council would consist 
of  25 members – the five current permanent members 
and 20 non-permanent members. From the remaining 
20 non-permanent seats, six would be awarded to the 
African States, five to Asian States, four to Latin Ame-
rican and Caribbean States, three to Western European 
and other States, and two to Eastern European States. 
Finally, the third group consists of  African coun-
tries gathered in the African Union (AU). Their propo-
sal, based on the so-called ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ – the 
common position adopted by the AU Member States,88 
anticipates an expansion of  the Security Council with 
six new permanent seats with the right of  veto, and 
five new non-permanent seats. In other words, accor-
ding to their proposal, the Council would consist of  26 
members.89 From 11 new seats, African States would be 
awarded two permanent seats and two non-permanent 
seats; Asian States would receive two permanent seats 
86  The other members of  the UFC are Canada, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Malta, Mexico, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.
87  For the UFC proposal see: UNITED NATIONS. General As-
sembly. UN Doc A/59/L68. Question of  equitable representation 
on and increase in the membership of  the Security Council and re-
lated matters, 21 July 2005. Available at: <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/434/76/PDF/N0543476.
pdf?OpenEleme nt> Access on: on: 5 feb. 2017.
88  For the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ see: <http://www.un.org/en/
africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_screform_2005.pdf> Access on: 5 feb. 
2017.
89  For the proposal supported by Algeria, Angola, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tu-
nisia, Uganda, United Republic of  Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
see: UNITED NATIONS. General Assembly. UN Doc A/59/L67. 
Question of  equitable representation on and increase in the mem-
bership of  the Security Council and related matters, 18 July 2005. 
Available: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
LTD/N05/421/67/PDF/N0542167.pdf?OpenElement> Access 
on: 5 feb. 2017.
and one non-permanent seat; East European States 
would receive one non-permanent seat; Latin American 
and Caribbean States would receive one permanent seat 
and one non-permanent seat; while Western European 
and other States would be awarded one permanent seat.
The clearly conflicting proposals presented by the 
G-4 countries, UFC and African countries testified to a 
deep division between Member States with regard to the 
Security Council’s reform. Moreover, it is symptomatic 
that only France and the United Kingdom supported 
the G-4 proposal, while other permanent members, wi-
thout whose approval the Charter cannot be amended 
nor the Council reformed, did not support any of  the 
proposals.90 Despite the fact that 170 heads of  state, ga-
thered at the 2005 World Summit at the United Nations’ 
headquarters in New York, unanimously supported ‘an 
early reform of  the Security Council’,91 the only possi-
ble consequence of  the deep division between Mem-
ber States was the continuation of  the status quo in the 
reform of  the United Nations’ most powerful body. 
This again confirmed that there is a general consensus 
among Member States on the necessity of  a reform of  
the Security Council, but it also showed significant di-
sagreements on how to do it.92 Nonetheless, after 15 
years of  futile search for a solution to this pressing issue 
within the Working Group, on the last day of  the 62nd 
Session of  the General Assembly, after tough negotia-
tions, the Decision 62/557 was unanimously adopted 
on the beginning of  intergovernmental negotiations 
in the early 2009.93 Although the progress was merely 
90  Article 108 of  the UN Charter stipulates: ‘Amendments to the 
present Charter shall come into force for all Members of  the United 
Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of  two thirds of  the 
members of  the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of  the Mem-
bers of  the United Nations, including all the permanent members 
of  the Security Council.’
91  ‘We support early reform of  the Security Council - an essential 
element of  our overall effort to reform the United Nations - in or-
der to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent 
and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and 
implementation of  its decisions. We commit ourselves to continuing 
our efforts to achieve a decision to this end and request the General 
Assembly to review progress on the reform set out above by the end 
of  2005.’ See: UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005).
92  FREISLEBEN, Jonas von. Reform of  the Security Council. 
In: CENTER FOR UN REFORM EDUCATION (ed). Managing 
Change at the United Nations. New York: Center for UN Reform Edu-
cation, 2008. p. 1; see also SCHRIJVER, Nico. Reforming the UN 
Security Council in Pursuance of  Collective Security. Journal of  Con-
flict & Security Law, v. 12, n. 1, p. 127, 2007. 
93  See: UNITED NATIONS. Resolutions and Decisions adopted by 
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symbolic and procedural, many diplomats prematurely 
assessed this ‘success’ as historical.94
Unfortunately, despite the euphoria which gripped 
the East River, intergovernmental negotiations on the 
reform of  the Security Council, which officially star-
ted in February 2009, proved to be equally unsuccessful 
as the previous attempts to solve the issue within the 
Working Group. Under the presidency of  Zahir Tanin 
(2009-2014), the Afghan permanent representative to 
the United Nations, ten rounds of  intergovernmental 
negotiations were held, which haven’t broken the im-
passe of  the Security Council’s reform process, due to 
the fact that the three main groups of  countries – G-4, 
UFC, African countries – did not budge from their ini-
tial positions. Apart from confirming the significant 
discord among Member States regarding the reform of  
the Council, the negotiations also showed a sharp di-
sagreement of  Member States regarding the rules of  
procedure of  intergovernmental negotiations. On the 
one hand, G-4 countries believe that decision-making 
in intergovernmental negotiations should be based on 
voting, while on the other hand, UFC maintains that 
decisions should be made on the basis of  a consen-
sus.95 Moreover, soon it became obvious that UFC – 
which enjoys the least support from Member States – 
was trying to slow the negotiations down, while G-4 
countries – which enjoy a considerable, yet insufficient 
support of  Member States – were trying to speed the 
negotiations up.96 In the late 2014, Courtney Rattray, the 
permanent representative of  Jamaica to the United Na-
tions, was appointed as the Chair of  intergovernmental 
negotiations, with the task of  moving the intergovern-
mental process towards text-based negotiations.
On 26 March 2015, the Chair circulated a framework 
document on the reform of  the Security Council to all 
Member States, with the request to complete the do-
cument with their own views and proposals regarding 
the five key issues of  the reform: categories of  mem-
the General Assembly during its sixty-second session. 23 December 2007 – 15 
September 2008. New York: United Nations, 2008. v. 3. p. 106-107.
94 See: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/16/
us-un-council-expansion-idUSN1533301720080916?pageN 
umber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0> Access on: 8 feb. 2017.
95  SWART, Lydia. Countries Welcome Work Plan as Security Council 
Reform process Commences New Phase. 24 February 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/386> Access on: 
13 feb. 2017.
96  See e.g. HANSEN, Mie. Update on Security Council Reform. 
5 April 2011. Available at: <http://www.centerforunreform.or 
g/?q=node/435> Access on: 13 feb. 2017.
bership, regional representation, the size of  an enlarged 
Security Council and working methods of  the Council, 
the question of  the veto and the relationship between 
the Council and General Assembly.97 On the basis of  
the collected opinions and proposals of  member states, 
a negotiating text was drafted which Sam K. Kutesa, 
President of  the 69th Session of  the General Assembly, 
described as a ‘sound basis’ for the following stage of  
intergovernmental negotiations.98 The text and its ac-
companying Annex,99 which was presented on 31 July 
2015, also allows us to see Member States’ most recent 
views on the reform of  the Security Council on the eve 
of  the 70th anniversary of  the United Nations. Our 
overview of  the negotiating text once again confirmed 
that there was no convergence of  opinions regarding 
the reform of  the Security Council among Member Sta-
tes – especially with regard to new permanent seats and 
the issue of  veto. Thus, G-4 still advocates the intro-
duction of  six new permanent seats without the right 
of  veto – four for G-4 members and two for African 
countries.100 Basing their attitude on the ‘Ezulwini Con-
sensus’, African countries advocate the introduction of  
six new permanent seats with the right of  veto, at least 
two of  which would be awarded to African countries.101 
The Arabic group, which consists of  23 Member States, 
demands a permanent Arab seat in case of  any future 
expansion of  permanent seats in the Council.102 On the 
other hand, UFC continues to oppose the introduction 
of  new permanent seats in the Council, and proposes 
the introduction of  a new category of  seats – long-term 
non-permanent seats.103 However, it should be noted 
that the vast majority of  Member States which comple-
ted the framework document agree that it is necessary 
to expand the Council by introducing new permanent 
97  For the framework document see: <http://www.un.org/pga/
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/03/270315_interg overnmen-
tal-negotiations-sc-reform.pdf> Access on 14 feb. 2017.
98  For the negotiating text and the accompanying letter by the 
President Kutesa see: <http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Security-Council-reform-IGN-31-Ju-
ly-2015.pdf> Access on: 14 feb. 2017.
99  For the ANNEX Part I see: <http://www.un.org/pga/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Security-Council-refor m-IGN-
31-July-2015-ANNEX_Part1.pdf> Access on 14 feb. 2017; for 
the ANNEX Part II see: <http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Security-Council-reform-IGN-31-July-
2015-ANNE X_Part2.pdf> Access on 14 feb. 2017.
100  ANNEX Part I, p. 3.
101  ANNEX Part II, p. 63.
102  ANNEX Part II, p. 116.
103  ANNEX Part II, p. 123.
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seats. Also, the majority of  Member States believes that 
the right of  veto should be abolished. Because it is an 
unrealistic expectation, a part of  them, such as African 
and Caribbean countries, believe that, so long as the ri-
ght of  veto exists, it should be extended to all mem-
bers of  the permanent category of  the Security Coun-
cil, which must enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges 
of  permanent membership including the right of  the 
veto. Furthermore, G-4 is willing to renounce the ri-
ght of  veto for new permanent members, while several 
countries propose a voluntary limitation or restraint of  
the use of  the veto in specific situations (e.g. genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes), while others 
propose a mandatory restriction of  the use of  the veto 
in the said situations.
Finally, it is interesting to examine the attitudes of  
the five permanent members of  the Security Council, 
without whose mutual consent a reform of  the Council 
is not possible. Thus, France supported the introduc-
tion of  new permanent seats for members of  G-4 and 
African countries, thereby emphasizing that they ‘would 
not oppose extension of  the veto to new permanent 
members if  the candidates to such permanent member-
ship were to pursue such an extension’.104 The United 
Kingdom also supports the introduction of  new perma-
nent seats for members of  G-4 and African countries, 
but it opposes the extension of  the veto to new per-
manent members.105 On the other hand, China refused 
to complete the framework document, holding that, ac-
cording to the Decision 62/557 adopted by the General 
Assembly as well as the consensus of  Member States, 
intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council re-
form should be driven by Member States, and the po-
sitions of  Member States should form the basis of  the 
negotiations.106 According to China, the said principles 
and the consensus are not reflected in the framework 
document, which simplified and reduced the views of  
Member States without their approval. Therefore, Chi-
na hasn’t modified its initial views according to which 
it generally supports the extension of  the Council, but 
without specifying the categories of  the new seats or re-
ferring to the extension of  the right of  veto. Apart from 
that, China also believes that all five key issues of  the 
reform should be solved as a whole, i.e. it opposes the 
‘piecemeal’ or ‘step-by-step’ approach, thereby clearly 
104  ANNEX Part I, p. 35.
105  ANNEX Part II, p. 67.
106  ANNEX Part II, p. 101.
emphasizing that ‘no solution on which Member States 
are seriously divided or approach that may cause divi-
sion among Member States will have China’s support’. 
Russia, which also hasn’t completed the framework do-
cument, but merely sent an official letter instead, also 
supports the extension of  the Council, but it does not 
specify the categories of  new permanent seats, except 
it considers that the number of  seats in the new exten-
ded Council should not exceed a reasonable level of  
low twenties.107 However, Russia emphasizes that ‘the 
prerogatives of  the current permanent members of  the 
Security Council, including the use of  veto, should re-
main intact under any variant of  the Council reform’. 
Additionally, Russia also believes that, in case of  a lack 
of  consensus among Member States with regard to the 
reform of  the Council, it is necessary to ensure support 
by the overwhelming majority of  Member States – a 
substantially greater number than the legally required 
two thirds of  votes at the General Assembly. Finally, 
the United States, which also haven’t completed the fra-
mework document, but sent an official letter instead, are 
willing to support a modest expansion of  both perma-
nent and non-permanent members, but consideration 
of  new permanent members must be country-specific 
in nature.108 Regarding the issue of  the veto, the United 
States remains opposed to ‘any alteration or expansion 
of  the veto’.
Despite an obvious disagreement between Member 
States regarding both material and procedural matters 
of  the reform of  the Security Council, on 14 Septem-
ber 2015, the General Assembly decided to ‘immedia-
tely continue intergovernmental negotiations on Secu-
rity Council reform, building on the positions of  and 
proposals made by Member States reflected in the text 
and its annex circulated by the President of  the General 
Assembly in his letter dated 31 July 2015’.109 It is diffi-
cult to predict the further course of  events, although 
one thing is certain: this endless game between Member 
States enters into its 25 year, while the answer from the 
East River to the question – When will the reform of  
the Security Council finally take place? – remains un-
107  ANNEX Part II, p. 109.
108  ANNEX Part II, p. 114.
109  For the Decision see: UNITED NATIONS. General Assem-
bly. UN Doc A/69/L92. Question of  equitable representation on 
and increase in the membership of  the Security Council and related 
matters, 11 September 2015. Available at: <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/278/16/PDF/N1527816.
pdf?Open Element> Access on: 23 feb. 2017.
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changed: Godot will certainly come tomorrow.
5. fInAl conclusIons
The world is changing, but not the Security Council. 
While humanity is helpless in the face of  armed con-
flicts raging across our planet, United Nations Mem-
ber States have been, for almost a quarter of  a century, 
unsuccessfully trying to reform the body which they 
themselves entrusted with the primary responsibility of  
maintaining international peace and security. 25 years 
have been wasted, thousands of  meetings were held, 
miles of  paper and oceans ink were spent for the pur-
pose of  the reform of  the United Nations’ most power-
ful organ, and yet there is still no sign of  a final solution. 
Moreover, an overview of  the previous attempts to re-
form the Security Council leads us to the only possible 
conclusion – ‘the emperor has no clothes’. Although 
merely a drop in the ocean of  academic attempts to 
contribute to the solution of  the problem, this article 
is trying to draw attention to the need for an urgent re-
form of  the Security Council, i.e. to unacceptability of  
its further delay, supporting it with, among other things, 
inefficiency of  the Council in performing its main task 
– maintenance of  international peace and security. Fur-
themore, some countries, with regard to their financial 
and military contributions to the United Nations as well 
as to their military force, economic power and popu-
lation size, must be included in the Council’s decision-
-making process through the permanent membership 
in the Council. Since it is unrealistic to expect that the 
permanent members will give up the right of  veto, the 
only realistic solution in terms of  mitigating the nega-
tive effects of  the right of  veto is the reform of  the 
Council’s decision-making process related to procedural 
matters. Finally, it is high time to reach a political com-
promise among all Member States regarding the reform 
of  the Security Council on the basis of  previous views 
and proposals expressed by Member States. This parti-
cularly refers to the five permanent members of  the Se-
curity Council, which hold the key to the amendments 
to the Charter, and consequently also to the reform 
of  the Council, in their hands. We can only hope that 
Member States will fulfill their moral obligation towards 
humanity, which deserves to live in a better and safer 
world, and undertake an urgent reform of  the Securi-
ty Council. Otherwise, prophetic words spoken by the 
American president Harry S. Truman during the signing 
the Charter on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco might 
come true: ‘If  we fail to use it, we shall betray all those 
who have died in order that we might meet here in free-
dom and safety to create it. If  we seek to use it selfishly, 
for the advantage of  any one nation or any small group 
of  nations, we shall be equally guilty of  that betrayal.’110
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